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Introduction
Recent phenomena like the global COVID-19 pandemic and evolving
trends toward the increasing digitization of everyday and criminal activities have
created unique and unprecedented challenges for the United States criminal justice
system. Experts have argued that the internet has transformed criminal behavior by
changing the landscape of risks and opportunities, citing creative and rapidly
escalating uses of digital technology in crimes like homicide, sexual assault, mass
murder, and cannibalism.1 These changes in risks and vulnerabilities have
accelerated since 2019 due to widespread stay-at-home orders and quarantine
mandates that have forced individuals and organizations to transition toward
conducting many activities of daily life and business in digital environments with
little to no guidance about how to navigate this transition safely. Despite predictions
that crime rates would fall due to decreased social contacts resulting from stay-athome orders and business closures, many United States cities have reported
substantial increases in major crimes like homicides, aggravated assaults, and gun
assaults.2 Perhaps even more concerning research indicates that international and
domestic terrorists are effectively using digital technology to exploit the chaos and
uncertainty caused by the pandemic in numerous nefarious ways including
fomenting civil rebellion and challenging trust in government agencies.3
One particularly effective tactic used by domestic terrorists during the
pandemic involves the inflammation and exploitation of citizen fears of tyranny in
the form of mass surveillance and violations of their rights to free speech and
privacy.4 The transition to conducting daily life in cyberspace that was precipitated
by the pandemic has contributed to a blurring of boundaries between public and
private, forcing criminal justice professionals to think critically about how to
balance the oft conflicting goals of safeguarding free speech while protecting
citizens from threats like domestic terrorism and stranger-perpetrated homicide.
The Supreme Court has thus far declined to provide adequate guidance about the
types of online threat speech that are not constitutionally protected, and the
guidance that the Court has communicated about standards of reasonableness and
intent is murky at best.5 This lack of clear guidance is problematic because research
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supports the claim that many violent crimes like stranger-related homicides, mass
killings, and domestic terror attacks could be disrupted and even prevented if
internet communications in domains like social media platforms were employed
more effectively as tools for intelligence gathering and threat assessment.6 It is clear
that criminal justice professionals and researchers at multiple levels of government
will need to collaborate to clarify free speech guidance and bolster safeguards, to
pursue a more complete understanding about the role of digital communications in
violent crime, and to improve tactical threat assessment and response capabilities.7
Misconstrual of Privacy in Cyberspace
The issue of privacy in online communications is complex in part because
the intuitions, expectations, beliefs, and felt experiences of users often conflict with
legal realities. Online spaces like social media platforms typically feel to users as
though they are private, in part because users often access these platforms from
physically private locations like home offices, bedrooms, and even bathrooms; yet
legal precedent dictates that social media spaces are equivalent to public spaces.8
In its 2017 Packingham v. North Carolina ruling, the Supreme Court equated the
internet to a public square, stating that only minimal restrictions should be imposed
on public use, and acknowledging that social media play a vital role in many aspects
of contemporary life.9 While the designation of social media as public spaces seems
straightforward from a purely legal standpoint, there is substantial concern that
broadly defining the internet as a public forum creates unanticipated opportunities
for exploitation of information that citizens intend and make efforts to protect as
private.10 These concerns are grounded in the notion that the internet is a
qualitatively different type of space from physical public or private realms;
therefore, it requires a different legal and ethical approach to privacy that accounts
for the different types and quantities of personal data that exist in cyberspace.11
Some researchers contend that the use of social media intelligence as a
policing tool is tantamount to deliberately exploiting public ignorance because
people who erroneously believe that they can selectively protect their online
communications or create private nooks in cyberspace are more likely to
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unwittingly trap and incriminate themselves.12 While this seems like a rational
criticism, it would set a dangerous and worrisome precedent to decide that
ignorance of the law constitutes a valid excuse for breaking it, and this argument
represents a rather bleak view of the collective public intellect that is hopefully
unwarranted. Additionally, while government interests should not trump individual
civil liberties, even opponents of social media intelligence recognize its tremendous
value as a mechanism for prosecuting, disrupting, and preventing serious threats to
public safety including mass violence and terror.13 Given the fraught nature of this
issue, the best way forward will likely involve a multipronged strategy that
prioritizes educating citizens about the public nature of the internet and about how
to protect their data from unintended use or exploitation by others in their social
networks, online companies, their employers, and government agencies. It is also
critical for law enforcement agencies to be transparent about their online data
collection and surveillance practices while being able to articulate how these
practices keep the public safe without endangering civil liberties, and for
researchers to continue exploring and instigating dialogs about the evolving nature
of privacy in online spaces and its influence on liberty, safety, and security.
Demystifying True Online Threats vs. Protected Violent Speech
The internet is used by violent criminals like domestic terrorists for multiple
purposes including to explicitly state their intentions to harm and kill others, to
engage in and share violent fantasies, to communicate with and threaten victims,
and to share content like manifestos that can signify escalation.14 The ability to
quickly identify and respond to credible threats that are communicated in
cyberspace could help police to disrupt and even prevent crimes that often result in
mass injuries and casualties, but the legal definition of credible online threat speech
remains unresolved.15 The context of global pandemic and criminality in
cyberspace make this appear to be a novel issue, but it simply represents a new
direction in the decades-old debate about the types of incendiary speech that should
be protected by the Constitution and the types of speech that are heinous and
threatening enough to warrant prosecution. The Supreme Court has consistently
held for decades that threatening speech that falls outside constitutional protections
must be narrowly defined, but the Court has also steadily refused to provide clear
and specific guidance regarding how credible threats should be identified.16 This is
an inherently difficult issue to decide from a juridical standpoint, because

Rønn and Søe, “Privacy in Public,” 369-371.
Ibid., 367-368.
14
Recupero, “Homicide and the Internet,” 217.
15
Ibid., 224.
16
Best, “Need to Uphold Individual Rights,” 1136-1138.
12
13

4

threatening communications involve both the original intent and behavior of the
communicator and the beliefs and reactions of the message recipient
The Supreme Court’s 1942 opinion in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire
established the “fighting words” doctrine, holding that speech that is intended to
provoke another person to commit violent acts in the public square is not protected
by the Constitution.17 In its 1969 Watts v. United States decision the Court set a
draconian standard for successfully identifying and prosecuting threatening speech,
holding that a public statement that the defendant would kill the President of the
United States if drafted into the Army did not constitute a true threat because the
statement was conditional and lacked at least some of the necessary elements of an
intentional threat.18 Also in 1969, the Brandenburg v. Ohio majority opinion held
that speech encouraging others to commit violent crimes is protected by the First
Amendment of the Constitution unless that speech incites immediate criminal
actions.19 Interestingly, the history of legal precedent surrounding the issue of
protected speech versus true threats indicates that the boundary between freedom
of expression and criminal interpersonal violence is often tested by domestic
extremist groups like violent protesters and the Ku Klux Klan. While the Watts and
Brandenburg decisions were intended to protect citizens from being prosecuted for
voicing unpopular social and political views, they also increased the difficulty of
preventing murder, terror, and insurrection by shielding broad categories of violent
and threatening speech under the umbrella of the First Amendment.20
In the more recent 2003 Virginia v. Black decision, the Supreme Court
decided that the First Amendment protects cross burnings, asserting that true threats
involve elements of serious intent to perpetrate criminal violence targeting a
specific person or group.21 While it is typically not difficult to determine whether a
specific individual or group of persons has been targeted, the concept of serious
intent to cause harm is very subjective and it is easy to imagine how difficult it
might be for a jury to evaluate, especially in the context of digital communications.
As contemporary cases illustrate, there are qualitative nuances that affect the
threatening nature of online activities like posting savage and murderous fantasies
about specific people on social media, creating posts that advocate violence against
an individual and sharing that person’s identifiers and locational data, or describing
why a particular school or residence might represent a soft target for a mass killing.
The Supreme Court’s 2015 Elonis v. United States decision illustrates just how
difficult it is to convict an individual for communicating true threats in
17
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cyberspace.22 The case syllabus describes how Anthony Douglas Elonis used his
Facebook page to produce explicitly violent fantasies in the form of rap lyrics
targeting his wife, his co-workers, and a group of kindergarten children; but his
conviction was overturned because the jury in the original case had been instructed
to use a reasonableness standard rather than the stricter intent standard.23
The Elonis case is troubling because his wife believed his threats were
credible and she pursued a restraining order, his employer believed his threats were
credible and terminated his employment, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
believed his threats were credible and began surveilling his online communications,
and a jury decided that a reasonable person would find his threats credible; yet
Elonis’s stated intention of achieving catharsis through creating rap lyrics
ultimately decided the case in his favor.24 Elonis is an illustrative example of the
nexus between reasonableness, intent, and context that makes identifying and
prosecuting threats in cyberspace so complex. Elonis was correct that a reasonable
person standard is too broad for threat speech cases because it does not account for
the mental state of the speaker, and it could result in the punishment of innocent
people for unknowingly or unwilfully communicating in ways that a jury might
find unacceptable.25 However, it also appears that a serious intent standard is likely
too narrow given that Elonis was able to post diagrams of his wife’s house including
statements describing how easy it would be to shoot her with specific weapons from
specific locations and pass these horrifying communications off as lyrical art.26
Perhaps the most critical challenge posed by Elonis is the need for criminal justice
practitioners and researchers to improve their skills in effectively analyzing context
when evaluating potentially threatening social media communications.27
In light of the problems raised within Elonis, experts have recommended
two potential solutions that the court system might adopt in order to make it easier
to identify and prosecute true threats in cyberspace while maintaining strong
safeguards protecting the innocent from punishment and shielding free speech that
the majority might find inflammatory, needlessly graphic, and violent. The first
recommendation involves the development of a dual reasonable-recipient and
reasonable-speaker standard that integrates the intent of the speaker and the
reactions of their audiences.28 This proposed hybrid standard is likely the best way
22
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to provide the court system with a practicable standard for appraising credible
threats that effectively reconciles the opposing goals of safeguarding free speech
while protecting victims from true threats.29 The second recommendation describes
the creation of a context defense specific to online threat cases that would permit
defendants to introduce contextual evidence demonstrating nonthreatening intent
and incorporating special jury instructions describing distinctions between true
credible threats and constitutionally protected speech that is violent or distasteful.30
Incorporating these types of recommendations could represent a critical step toward
protecting free speech while better equipping police and prosecutors to protect
citizens from threats like stranger-initiated homicide, mass killings, and terrorism.
Cyberspace is a Hunting Ground
Since context is such a central component of threatening speech in
cyberspace, it is vital for criminal justice practitioners and policymakers to
understand the multifarious ways in which the internet in general and social media
in particular are commonly employed in the commission of specific types of violent
crimes. Some violent criminals use the internet as a platform for engaging with a
larger audience and communicating their intent to kill, sharing ideological beliefs,
inspiring followers, and even livestreaming crimes like sexual assaults and
homicides.31 The internet also contains uncountable spaces and opportunities for
violent criminals to acquire knowledge about topics like how to make bombs or
how to kill a person without leaving evidence, as well as sources to purchase tools
like body armor, poison, and illegal weapons.32 One of the more chilling
affordances the internet provides to violent criminals involves its use as a hunting
ground where criminals can target, stalk, and interact with victims from a position
of relative anonymity.33 Future research about the role of the internet in specific
types of violent crime is urgently important because behavioral patterns can be used
to develop profiles, inform threat assessments, and demonstrate proof of intent.34
It has been argued that internet-facilitated homicides should occupy their
own special category as a distinct subtype of homicide, but it seems more likely
that there is an online component to the majority of contemporary homicides given
the rapid global digitization of many aspects of everyday life.35 In fact, federal and
state law enforcement agencies have long recognized that the internet has given
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criminals a huge technological advantage, provided them with easy access to a
limitless population of potential victims, and rapidly transformed patterns like the
methodology and victimology of traditional violent crimes.36 Given this
knowledge, the internet and social media should be conceptualized as a networked
support system that is transmogrifying the way violent crimes are fantasized about,
planned, and committed rather than as a completely new environment signifying a
new type of crime.37 This perspective makes it possible to examine the constituent
components of a violent crime - offender, victim, behavior, motive, modus
operandi, and harm - with the goal of understanding whether discrete patterns of
internet use commonly affect any or all of these components during the perpetration
of specific types of violent crimes.38 A brief investigation of some of the ways in
which violent offenders use the internet will provide concrete real-world examples
showing the kind of information that can be gleaned from internet surveillance and
used to inform risk assessments and to establish dangerous intent.
Lone-actor or lone-wolf terrorists are individuals who commit violent
crimes that are ideologically motivated and that are designed to spread fear without
the support or direction of a larger group or organization.39 The title lone-wolf is a
bit of a misnomer because these individuals are often involved with extremist
groups through social media, they typically undergo a radicalization process
through exposure to online extremist ideologies, and they may view themselves as
representatives of a group rather than as lone actors.40 These individuals often spend
a great deal of time fantasizing about and planning their attacks, and many solo
mass shooters have posted comprehensive bodies of online content prior to their
attacks including lengthy written manifestos, videos, and letters openly declaring
their intentions to perpetrate attacks and identifying specific targeted individuals or
locations.41 While manifestos riddled with hate speech and asinine videos detailing
violent fantasies are protected by the First Amendment unless they signify
imminent harm to a specific person or persons, these communications exist within
a public forum, and they can be used to identify a person as a credible risk to the
safety of others and to place that person under surveillance. Consistent expression
of violent fantasies and hatred against individuals and groups can also be used to
36

John E. Douglas et al., Crime Classification Manual: A Standard System for Investigating and
Classifying Violent Crime (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2013), 44-45.
37
Liem and Geelen, “Homicide and the Internet,” 70.
38
Aldona Kipane, “Meaning of Profiling of Cybercriminals in the Security Context,” SHS Web of
Conferences 68 (2019): 1-15.
39
Mohammadmoein Khazaeli Jah and Ardavan Khoshnood, “Profiling Lone-Actor Terrorists: A
Cross-Sectional Study of Lone-Actor Terrorists in Western Europe (2015-2016),” Journal of
Strategic Security 12, no. 4 (2019): 26.
40
Ibid., 29.
41
Recupero, “Homicide and the Internet,” 220.

8

establish a pattern of behavior consistent with intent to commit a violent crime and
used to prosecute individuals and to inform profiles to guide resource allocation.42
Crime statistics indicate that the United States has a high rate of strangerperpetrated homicides when compared with other industrialized nations, and
research suggests that the internet plays a pivotal role in many stranger-perpetrated
homicides including serial offenses.43 Killers who target strangers often do so for
instrumental reasons, meaning they are motivated by the desire to obtain something
from their victims such as renown, sexual gratification, money, or material
objects.44 These predators use the cloak of cyberspace to hunt and lure their victims
using strategies like designing fake social media accounts, offering to meet for
sexual encounters, advertising jobs or services, promising to provide some sort of
assistance, and engaging in various other forms of deception about their true
identities and intentions.45 Although human behavior is dynamic and continuously
evolving, violent criminals learn to use techniques that consistently help them to
achieve their goals while minimizing undesirable risks; therefore, it is possible to
identify and track indicators of online hunting, stalking, and luring behavior
patterns with the aims of disrupting and preventing violent predation.46 These
hunting behaviors are certainly more surreptitious than hate speech and open
declarations of intent to kill on social media, but they still represent discernable
behavior patterns that can be used in building offender typologies, guiding
surveillance strategies, and establishing criminal intent, motive, and premeditation.
Shrinking Big Data
Researchers exploring the antecedent behavior of public mass killers47 and
intimate partner homicide offenders48 have identified numerous indicators of online
threatening behavior that typically precede these violent crimes including
expressing homicidal thoughts, acquiring weapons, articulating specific plans, and
engaging in surveillance and cyberstalking of intended victims via social media. It
42
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appears that law enforcement agencies should be able to prevent or disrupt a
substantial number of violent crimes like lone actor killings, stranger-perpetrated
homicides, and intimate partner homicides by leveraging online behavioral threat
indicators, but the sheer magnitude of data that individuals produce and share on
social media makes this seem like a herculean challenge. Fortunately, there are
many nascent big data strategies and systems that have tremendous potential as
tools for strategic and tactical criminal intelligence, and these tools often have
cross-functional capabilities across different types of crisis situations like
preventing mass killings and allocating resources during the COVID-19
pandemic.49 Crowdsourcing data, the practice of engaging with a community as
valued partners and teaching interested citizens about online behavioral threat
indicators that should be shared with law enforcement, can be an effective and
flexible strategy for expanding limited resources, maintaining police transparency,
and building trusting relationships.50 The value of crowdsourcing is supported by
specific online behaviors that have been reported to law enforcement prior to
successful mass shooting attacks including website evidence that the 1999
Columbine School shooters made specific advance threats and purchased weapons,
and email evidence revealing that the 2009 Fort Hood Army Base shooter was
communicating with extremists and might be planning a “heroic” suicide attack.51
While crowdsourcing is certainly a useful resource, it does not allow law
enforcement to proactively search for specific behavioral indicators, and a more
targeted instrument would be better suited for guiding decisions about surveillance
and resource allocation. Social media data mining techniques like link analysis and
sentiment analysis can equip law enforcement to actively search for specific types
of information and even to analyze and classify the sources of that information.52
Link analysis uses specialized types of search algorithms to explore interconnected
links and map related content, while sentiment analysis uses machine-learning
methods to identify peoples’ attitudes or opinions about particular topics and to
evaluate the relative strength and positive or negative quality of those opinions.53
Social media link analysis can be a particularly powerful tool toward the
prevention, disruption, and prosecution of crimes like domestic terror, gang
violence, and mass killing because it can be used to map social networks and to
chart threatening behavioral indicators like frequenting extremist or violent fetishist
websites, and liking or sharing memes that represent fascination with or incitement
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to commit violent crimes. This information can be strengthened by sentiment
analysis designed to expose online behavior patterns that reflect threatening
attitudes like misogyny, depersonalization of outgroup members, glorification of
violence, and strong positive sentiments about lawlessness and chaos.
Behavioral Profiling and Human Judgment
Algorithms and machine learning undoubtedly have exciting and immense
potential to empower law enforcement to combat violent crimes, but these tools
must be used with careful consideration and transparency because they can also
create mistrust among citizens who fear the dawning of a science fiction-inspired
surveillance state policed by indifferent machines. Additionally, machine learning
is not a substitute for the intuition that experienced police, profilers, and
criminology researchers have gained through years of embodied experience about
human aspects of violent crime like complex emotional responses, imaginative
fantasies, and often aesthetic signatures.54 These complementary cautions suggest
that the best implementation model should take advantage of the nearly unlimited
processing power of computers to mine, organize, and map data while maintaining
the primacy of human judgment in making decisions about how to deploy assets
and about which individuals are likely to constitute authentic threats. A criminal
profiling case study investigating a murderer’s Facebook page to determine his
motive revealed the importance of professional experience and human intuition in
understanding threats, motivations, and intentions.55 In this case, the cumulative
evidence that a computer algorithm would have detected overwhelmingly
supported a satanic ritualistic motive, but when the forensic investigator conducted
an exhaustive review of the offender’s social media account he discovered buried
clues indicating that the motive was actually to punish a pedophilic abuser.56
This case study illustrates the value of an emerging field in profiling and
crime analysis called digital behavior analysis. Digital behavior analysis
encompasses the investigation of digital criminal footprints using an amalgamation
of traditional and novel methods to achieve goals like understanding motives,
linking crimes of serial offenders, and designing offender typologies based on
modus operandi, victim characteristics, and offender demographics and
behaviors.57 Through the method of idiographic digital profiling, specialists can
track a subject’s behavior across multiple websites, determine the true identities of
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anonymous users, map a subject’s social network, evaluate the type and quantity of
a subject’s social interactions, and track a subject’s physical movements using tools
like geolocation.58 Innovative techniques like idiographic digital profiling are
especially needful within the contemporary context of the digital transformation of
traditional violent crime and ongoing public safety and peacekeeping challenges
stemming from the global COVID-19 pandemic. These digital profiling methods
will better equip law enforcement to counter the technologically advanced
strategies used by many violent criminals by combining computing power and
human judgment to exploit behavioral traces hidden in cyberspace.59
Conclusion
The past few years have ushered in unprecedented challenges to the criminal
justice system caused by global crises and runaway trends like the COVID-19
pandemic, the digitization of everyday life, and the rise in violent crimes facilitated
by technology. The present situation has created an imperative for criminal justice
practitioners and researchers to develop and implement better tools, systems, and
strategies for using internet data to combat violent crimes like mass killings and
stranger-imitated homicides while safeguarding the free speech and privacy rights
of citizens. While the Internet is legally recognized as a public space, the courts
need to more clearly define the specific kinds of online speech that are not protected
by the Constitution, and they need to adopt a practicable intent standard for
prosecuting credible threats while protecting innocent individuals from being
punished for unpopular or offensive constitutionally protected speech. Citizens
rights can be protected, and their privacy concerns can be addressed by law
enforcement through several strategies including educating citizens about their
online rights and vulnerabilities, partnering with communities and integrating their
input into threat assessments, and maintaining transparency as much as possible
about digital surveillance and data mining tools employed. Finally, the growing
field of digital behavior analysis shows great promise as a mechanism for protecting
citizens from dual threats of tyranny and violent crime by capitalizing on the data
mining and organizing capacities of machine intelligence while relying on human
intuition, judgment, and professional experience to guide decisions.
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